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Conflict management is done by both state and non-state institutions in Vanuatu, a 
small archipelago situated in the region known as Melanesia in the South Pacific.  
Each institution has a range of different resources available to it, for example, 
customary institutions in general are rich in human resources and legitimacy, while 
the state justice system has significantly greater financial and coercive resources.  
However, for a variety of reasons expounded upon below, both state and non-state 
institutions are failing to satisfactorily meet the conflict management needs of 
Vanuatu citizens (Forsyth 2009).
1
 Given the current spread across institutions of the 
resources necessary to manage disputes, and the lack of capacity for any one 
institution to monopolise these in the near future, any international donor interested in 
undertaking reform in this area must actively engage with both state and non-state 
institutions and actors. This reality of legal pluralism can provoke a number of 
responses.  One is to attempt to harness the resources of the non-state system by 
bringing it within the apparatus of the state system (see for example Huyse and Salter 
2008), and another is to create a new hybridized system that merges state and non-
state orders (see for example Walker and Garu 2009, Boege et al 2008).  This article 
proposes a third approach: to build or reinforce existing linkages between all state and 
non-state institutions and actors that are currently involved in conflict management 
(see also Baker 2010: 598).   
 
The creation of linkages can have a number of advantages over subordination or 
hybridization. First, it responds to the idea of harnessing voluntary and legitimate 
social ordering and only resorting to state sanctions when this fails (Braithwaite 
2002:29).  Second, it recognises that state forms of ordering themselves need to be 
subjected to oversight by other social institutions, and thus in a healthy regulatory 
system, mutual monitoring is both necessary and legitimate. Third, linkages can 
facilitate a more efficient sharing of resources between institutions and actors, whilst 
leaving space for each to perform the role that it does best.  Fourth, linkages can 
promote dialogue about existing or potential conflicts of agenda in a non-hierarchical 
way, leaving more room for creative compromises than if a top-down approach is 
                                                 
1
 The term conflict management is used in this article as it is broad enough to include processes which 
go beyond dealing merely with particular disputes, thus allowing a study “of the relationship of rule 
orders to behaviour”  (Chanock 2000: xviii).  The phrase ‘justice’ is also avoided because it carries 
with it connotations associated with western ‘justice’ systems, such as the importance of individual 
rights, consistency in judgments, a fair and open trial, impartial judges and the right to present a 
defence. As discussed below, in countries such as Vanuatu, these may not be the priorities of conflict 
management and concepts such as the re-establishment of peace and harmony in the community and 
the restoration of relationships may be prioritised.  The use of the term “justice” may mask these 
fundamental differences in agenda, creating the assumption that all systems are reading from the same 
page when there might be considerable divergence of opinion in what priorities to be pursued. 
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adopted.  Fifth, linkages can facilitate different orders learning from the other, which 
can raise standards and legitimacy on both sides (Baker 2010: 609; Forsyth 2009: 
225-238).  While the end result of this may well be a hybridized system, it will have 
been achieved in an organic manner, driven by the needs and experiences of the actors 
involved, rather than having had its form pre-determined from the start.  Focussing on 
linkages is thus in many ways more a philosophy about how to go about doing reform 
and development in pluralist countries, than a reform program with a particular goal, 
such as improving access to justice, gradual compliance with international human 
rights, or building strong and legitimate institutions.  The central argument of this 
article is therefore that, regardless of the specific reform objectives involved, adopting 
an approach that focuses on strengthening linkages between the actors and institutions 
actually involved in a particular field will result in greater home-grown, legitimate 
and sustainable change in legally plural countries.  The focus in this article is on 
conflict management, but the general approach could be more widely applied. 
 
The first section of the article briefly outlines the current legal environment in 
Vanuatu, focussing on the relationship between the state and non-state conflict 
management providers, and demonstrating the importance of better links between 
them in building more effective and legitimate conflict management.  The second 
section demonstrates the potential of different sorts of links between the state justice 
system and customary actors and institutions.  It reflects on a number of initiatives 
that have taken place in Vanuatu in the past five years at both national and local 
levels, which have been initiated by the state, non-state actors, international donors 
and academics.   
 
Section three then introduces a new conceptual framework to assist international 
donors and state and non-state actors in creating such links, and also in developing, 
managing and aligning reform initiatives. The framework proposed is that of a 
‘conflict management web’ that joins together different actors, institutions, systems 
and sub-systems through multiple linkages both within and outside a country.  Such 
an approach requires a holistic view (Scott 2001: 332) to be taken of any reform 
project in this field.  This entails prioritising co-ordination with other projects, and 
making strategic alignment of the reform agenda with the interests and needs of key 
stakeholders in both state and non-state sectors central to the project design.   A 
conflict management web approach also emphasizes the importance of developing 
multiple linkages between state and non-state actors, donors and others: if one link 
breaks there are numerous others to bind the web together, and even if each link is 
individually weak, together they can be strong (Granovetter 1973 1985; Braithwaite 
2008: 201).  Moreover, a conflict management web would support incremental reform 
projects, useful where there are not the financial resources or political will for large 
scale institutional reform (Gupta 2002: 379).  The conflict management web approach 
finds support in the arguments used by Baker to support as ‘multi-layered’ approach 
to policing and justice (this issue).  It develops these ideas further by positioning the 
creation of linkages between conflict management providers in-country and external 
sources of support (donors, academics, NGOs) at the heart of the analysis about how 
to improve conflict management.  The final section of this article will more fully 
describe the web framework and discuss its implications for those involved in reform 




The Vanuatu Legal Environment2 
 
Conflict management in Vanuatu is mostly delivered by the state and the customary 
system of conflict management, referred to in Vanuatu as the kastom system.
3
  
Although the churches also play a minor role in conflict management, their role has 
not as yet been the subject of fieldwork, and so only state and kastom are discussed in 
this article.  The state system of conflict management is based on English and French 
models introduced during colonial times (1901-1980) and comprises western-style 
laws and institutions.  As a whole it currently faces a number of challenges, including 
chronic under-resourcing, slowness, limited geographical reach (particularly 
problematic given that the population is dispersed over numerous islands, some of 
which have no police post and many no court), human rights abuses and a lack of 
legitimacy as a result of being based upon a foreign system (Forsyth 2009: 166).  As a 
result, the state alone is currently unable to provide its citizens with acceptable levels 
of conflict management, or personal security.  For example, the Police Commissioner 
stated in 2011 (Marango 2011: 3) “[the] Vanuatu Police Force has a limited budget 
and can only do a portion of its part in sustaining security in Vanuatu.” 
 
The kastom system, in contrast, exists in one form or another throughout Vanuatu.  It 
handles the vast majority of conflicts in every rural and urban community (Forsyth 
2009: 97).  The central idea of kastom is that the chief or chiefs of a community are 
responsible for managing disputes within their areas of authority.
4
  They do so by 
holding public meetings with the parties involved in the disputes where the dispute is 
discussed, responsibility allocated and amends made through the payment of a fine, in 
the form of mats, kava, food, pigs, cows and increasingly cash, by one or both of the 
parties.     
 
The kastom system throughout the country is incredibly diverse, but it is possible to 
identify several core principles.  These allow ni-Vanuatu to distinguish ‘their’ system 
from the state system, even while separating their particular version of kastom from 
that of a different part of the country. For example, the Secretary of the National 
Council of Chiefs (NCC), in the context of a protest about prison conditions in which 
the prisoners had fled to the NCC for protection, stated on the radio (Pacific Beat 
2006): 
 
We made a ceremony and then the Chiefs handed the prisoners over to the 
other system of governance, that's the police again. So, it was really from one 
system to the other and making sure that both systems, protocols, 
procedures, are observed in the whole process. Yesterday, we believe that 
                                                 
2
 This description is based upon fieldwork conducted in Vanuatu between 2002 and 2008.  For a more 
detailed account see Forsyth (2009). 
3
 Although the use of the term ‘system’ may be criticised in a number of respects including for being 
misleading because it implies a coherence and structure that the kastom system does not have, I have 
defended the use of the term elsewhere (Forsyth 2009: 95-96).  Space does not permit a re-discussion 
of this point, save to note the concluding reason I gave for using it, namely that the “the kastom system 
is conceived of as such by many involved in its administration.” (ibid.) 
4
 Chiefs are the heads of particular communities and gain their positions through a variety of 
mechanisms including blood line, election and ability (Forsyth 2009: 61).  Generally an individual 
chief will deal with a minor matter and more serious matters or ‘appeals’ are dealt with by a council of 
chiefs (ibid.: 99). 
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we observed the two procedures for the two systems and we feel that we are 
quite satisfied with what we've done yesterday [my emphasis]. 
 
An underlying principle of the kastom system as enunciated by the chiefs and as 
practiced in the vast majority of cases, is that it is restorative. This means that dispute 
resolution is focused on restoring those relationships that have been broken by the 
disputes.  Two of the main aims of any kastom meeting are: blong mekem [tufala pati] 
shake han mo kam gudfala fren bakegen (to make the two parties shake hands and 
become good friends again), and to allow the defendant to mekem gud fes (literally 
‘clean (the person’s) face’ so as to regain respect in the community).  The purpose of 
this second aim is to allow the defendant to once again become a functioning member 
of the community.    
 
However, at times the restorative principles are not followed and the kastom system is 
used as a means of punitive control.  An example of this is given by a youth in Port 
Vila in 2007 who stated (Forsyth 2009: 108): 
 
I will tell you about a case of a relative of mine.  She had “flatem” [had sexual 
intercourse with] all the men around her and made lots of women very angry 
with her.  The chiefs tried everything they could to stop her – they cut off her 
hair, and they all whipped her.  Then finally they sent her back to the island.  
She stayed there for ten years and she saw how hard life was there, not like 
getting paid money for sex, and now she has come back to Vila ten years later 
a changed woman.  Now she stands next to the chiefs to assault the women 
who have children with no fathers! 
 
Another central principle of the kastom system is that of restoring peace and harmony 
to the community.  At times this principle conflicts with the restorative notions of the 
kastom system; for example victims who may not really be happy with the decision 
are forced to accept it and “shake hands” for the good of the community. This 
principle may also conflict with notions of individual rights as the peace of the 
community is prioritised over individual justice. Thus, the aims of conflict 
management differ quite significantly between kastom and the state justice system. 
 
While the kastom system resolves the majority of disputes, it also faces significant 
challenges, largely as a result of Vanuatu’s development as a nation state from what 
was a stateless society, and the pressures of rapid social change over the past decade 
as a result of globalisation.  For example, there has been a shift from a kastom based 
traditional economy, over which chiefs had a great deal of control, to a cash economy; 
and the population is increasingly mobile, which takes people out of the sphere of 
influence of their chief. Chiefs regularly complain that people refuse to listen to their 
orders, to come to meetings or pay the fines levied upon them.  In addition, 
community members challenge the chiefs on the basis that they have no authority 
under the Constitution; the police prevent chiefs from using force to enforce their 
orders; and people take disputes to the state system if they are not satisfied with the 
chiefs’ decision, thus undermining their authority.  Another difficulty associated with 
the kastom system today is that in many places it discriminates against women and 
youth, both procedurally by denying them a voice and also substantively, for example 
by fining a woman more than a man in a case of adultery. There is also a widespread 
perception that some chiefs are biased, and even more problematically, there is no real 
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way of dealing with biased, unfair, lazy or incompetent chiefs. As a result, many ni-
Vanuatu face the dilemma of believing in the kastom system and its advantages, but 
not being able to benefit from it because of the character of their particular chief.   
 
Despite these challenges, the kastom system is generally well-supported by the 
population today, including by women and youth. People appreciate its many benefits, 
including its essentially restorative nature, its geographic and financial accessibility; 
its familiarity; its ability to bring about peace and the fact that it is ‘their’ system.   
 
The relationship between kastom and the state system 
 
Since colonisation, ni-Vanuatu have thus been faced with at least two systems of 
conflict management that they can draw upon, depending upon particular 
circumstances (such as the accessibility and strength of both in a particular location) 
as well as personal preferences (such as support for or mistrust in kastom chiefs, the 
state, or the colonial powers, and beliefs about which system will lead to a more 
advantageous outcome).  The legitimate scope of the two systems has never been 
formalised, instead the unofficial division of jurisdiction has been left to individual 
institutions and administrators to negotiate. The results of this process have and do 
vary considerably over time and place (Forsyth 2009: 139-174).  Until very recently 
(as discussed below) there was little active dialogue between the two systems, or 
interchange of different legal views.  This was due in part to the lack of centralisation 
of the kastom system, endemic political instability and the difficulties of 
communication in Vanuatu generally, and also to the lack of institutional spaces for 
such dialogue to occur.  During the colonial period, District Agents and Assessors 
were formally charged with liaising between the two systems, and found themselves 
confronted with particular situations requiring them to reconcile procedural and 
substantive differences between the two systems. With independence, such roles 
disappeared, and with them the opportunity for conflicts between the systems to arise 
and be articulated on the level of legal principle.  
 
The current linkages between the systems are thus largely informal, dynamic and 
subject to continuous negotiation. Although this means that the relationship can easily 
adapt in response to the needs of each particular system and to define its own norms 
and procedural framework, it leads to unrestricted forum shopping and is problematic 
in many other respects. Among these are, for example: the feeling that a complainant 
could have got a better outcome with the ‘other’ system (however ill-founded) 
undermines reconciliation processes; confusion about which disputes should be dealt 
with where and with actors in both systems trying to avoid responsibility for difficult 
cases, such as those involving domestic violence by claiming the other system is 
responsible; and situations where people refuse to obey chiefly orders, claiming that 
they will ‘appeal’ to the state and the chief has no real authority (see Forsyth 2007: 
175-197, 254). 
 
An increasing cause of tension is the state’s heavy reliance upon the kastom system, 
especially in rural areas, coupled with its reluctance to contribute any resources or 
recognition in return.  The chiefs are becoming tired of being treated as the unpaid 
and unacknowledged assistants of the state system, and are increasingly vocalising 
demands for legislative recognition of chiefly powers. In the past, the state system has 
been able to brush off such demands by trotting out platitudes about the authority and 
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power of the chiefs resting in community respect. However, t is unlikely that this 
response will be tenable for much longer, especially given the evidence that 
community respect is partially unravelling for the chiefs. 
 
Thus we can see that both the state justice system and the kastom system are vital for 
ensuring conflicts are managed in an effective and legitimate way in Vanuatu.  
However, each system is currently facing significant challenges, its operation 
undermines the other in many respects, and they are largely missing out on the 
opportunity to be enriched by, and learn from, each other.
5
  Recognition of this means 
that any justice reform initiative should consider building the capacity and legitimacy 
of state and non-state systems, as supporting one to the exclusion of the other is 
unlikely to be effective (OECD 2007: 17).  One way to do this is to develop linkages 
between all relevant systems, for the reasons outlined in the introduction to this 
article. Baker (2010: 609) also argues that this “offers the opportunity of state 
oversight according to defined standards and within an affordable national budget, 
whilst at the same time linking state systems to non-state providers who may well 
enjoy local ownership, sustainability and effective procedures.”  Investigating how 
such linkages might be created is the subject of the next section. 
 
 
Initiatives linking state and kastom in Vanuatu 
 
In the past five years there have been a number of initiatives that have forged, or 
attempted to forge, closer links between the state and kastom systems, although this 
has not necessarily been the primary or even articulated goal of the initiative.  This 
part will demonstrate the interest in such links by actors in both state and kastom 
systems, and the important role that can be played by donors and academic 
institutions in facilitating the building of such links.  It will also highlight some of the 




(a) National Legislation 
 
The NCC has become increasingly proactive in the past eight years in seeking to 
organise the different levels of chiefly councils and to get the state to assist chiefs 
with enforcing their authority, such as making people pay kastom fines.  To this end, a 
National Council of Chiefs Bill was drafted, largely by the NCC but with assistance 
from a law professor, to set out the roles and powers of chiefs.  When the Bill reached 
parliament in 2006 it was debated for two days, and was amended to such an extent 
that it did not result in any real increased recognition of chiefly powers by the state.  
The only significant change was to give the NCC the authority to reshape existing 
island and urban councils of chiefs.  To date its efforts to do this have met with mixed 
success.
6
  The Secretary of the NCC commented that the Act as finally enacted by 
parliament was like a dog that had had all its teeth removed and yet was still expected 
to go and hunt pigs (Forsyth 2006). 
 
                                                 
5
 For a detailed analysis of the way in which each is undermining the other see Forsyth (2009:182-196). 
6
 For example, the Port Vila council of chiefs was dissolved in 2007 amid significant disagreement. 
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This exercise demonstrates the extremely contentious and politicised nature of 
discussions over chiefly powers in Vanuatu.  It also shows that although state leaders 
may make general statements about the importance of traditional leaders and kastom, 
when it comes to engaging in any real power sharing then they are reluctant to give 
any responsibility away, and so this is a process that involves much time and 
dialogue.  Although the highly contested nature of these issues does make it difficult 
for donors to become engaged, there is a potentially very useful role for them in 
funding research and workshops to assist in making sure the debates are as informed 
as possible.  It is likely that much more could have been achieved with the Bill if there 
had been more support for the NCC in preparing and workshopping the legislation 
with those involved in the state justice system (police, prison officers, prosecutors, 
judges, Ministry of the Justice officials etc) , as well as with interest groups, such as 
those representing women and youth, before presenting it to parliament. 
 
(b) Kastom Governance Partnership Project.   
 
The Kastom Governance Project was initiated following an informal meeting between 
the Secretary of the NCC and a member of Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict 
Studies (ACPACS), and then Australian Development Agency (AusAID) was brought 
in as a donor in 2005 (ODE 2010: 13). The overall aim of the project (ODE 2010: 28) 
is to support kastom so as to “support the way of life of Ni-Vanuatu: environmental 
sustainability, economic prosperity, peace, justice, equity.”  The central activities of 
the project are research on aspects of the kastom governance system by ACPACS and 
storians (workshops) which facilitate dialogue on kastom leadership, change, 
development and conflict resolution between chiefs, community leaders, women and 
youth representatives, provincial government officials and police.  The storians also 
involve creating action plans to put into practice some of the ideas generated at the 
workshop.  A project leader (Westoby 2010: 15) describes these storians as being 
“structured contexts for facilitated conversations around questions that community 
leaders regularly face but rarely have an opportunity to work through together in a 
reflective context.  That is, they are understood as ‘difficult conversations’ that could 
lead to innovative action.”   
 
Although hampered by delays caused by a variety of internal process problems, the 
kastom governance project offers a number of positive lessons in how external 
agencies such as a university can assist a non-state system to contribute to conflict 
management.  One positive feature of the initiative is the amount of agency that was 
given to the chiefs in the design and operation of the project.  The project design was 
based upon “a year of conversation” (Westoby and Brown, 2007: 77-78) during which 
time, trust and mutual respect was established between ACPACS and the NCC.  Since 
then, the NCC has played an important role in the design of the project.  A project 
developer observed that the project consciously tried to avoid a common mistake in 
approach to development in the Pacific Islands which involves “teach[ing] them how 
to ‘do’ our institutions better” and instead to recognise “communities and customary 
leaders’ efforts to be self-determining – creating spaces that enable people to 
negotiate ways through the currents of rapid change that enable them to hold what 
they value” (Westoby 2010: 15, 18).  The participatory nature of the project was also 
enhanced through the training of local facilitators who were gradually given greater 
and greater responsibility for the implementation of the workshops.  The strong sense 
of ownership of the activities by the NCC, and the facilitator-only role that ACPACS 
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assumed, also mitigated much of the risk of AusAID (and the Australian government) 
being perceived as interfering in such a highly charged political issue (ODE 2010: 
34). 
 
The project also illustrates a number of difficulties in working with a non-state 
system. First, is the difficulty of determining whom to engage with, a particularly 
difficult question in a decentralised system. The project dealt with this by working 
through the NCC.  However, this was not entirely satisfactory as it privileged those 
chiefs who are associated with the national system.  It also meant that some important 
community leaders were not involved, and this led to difficulties in the 
implementation of the action plans (ODE 2010: 22).  Second, it demonstrates that a 
truly participatory design process requires time to establish trust, to build relationships 
and to discuss how things will be.  Third, the implementation of the action plans was 
found to be “patchy” (ibid.). This illustrates the difficulty of implementing the many 
good ideas that occur in the relaxed space of a workshop when there is a return to 
‘real life’ and, perhaps, an encounter with a competing political agenda.  In order for 
this to be successful, there needs to be continual support and follow up, as is 
apparently planned for the next phase (ibid.: 23).   
 
The final challenge is how to support the human rights of marginalised groups such as 
women and children, whilst at the same time permitting the participants to determine 
the direction that the workshops and the action plans take. There is a potential for the 
project to “strengthen a chiefly system that includes practices detrimental to women” 
(ibid.).  This issue will inevitably arise in every discussion about reforming the 
kastom system because of a widespread belief that traditionally the kastom system 
was strongly patriarchal and authoritarian.  It is therefore common for many chiefs 
today to blame their lack of authority on the greater rights allowed to women and 
youth, and to try to shore up their authority by increasing controls over them.  
Although the anthropological record does not support this belief (Tor and Toka 2004), 
these views are firmly entrenched and have led to considerable friction when NGOs 
have come into communities with a rights-oriented training and development agenda.  
Indeed, a workshop organiser observed that “chiefs often stated in storians that many 
of these ‘development’ agents were contributing to, and partly causing, conflict within 
communities” (Westoby 2008: 50).  It is therefore clear that adopting a rigid rights 
based approach will risk alienating participants and undermining any project.  This 
observation is supported by Merry’s study of bulubulu (traditional forgiveness) in Fiji 
where she found that a rights discourse backfired in a project intending to stop people 
using bulubulu to avoid prosecution for rape, and led to an increase in bulubulu rape 
cases and the discrediting of human rights and feminist discourses (Merry 2006: 122). 
 
A better approach is to establish a foundation of trust between participants and 
facilitators to initiate conversations about gender and youth, giving space for all 
participants to reflect on the issues raised.  Braithwaite (2010) similarly talks about 
the need to “vernacularise” restorative justice discourse into the language of local 
traditions in a way that shows respect to those traditions.  This will at the very least 
lead to a more nuanced understanding of the issues involved, and the conflicts can be 
approached “conversationally rather than coercively.”  For example, at one workshop 
I attended the chiefs complained that the youth were causing problems in the 
community.  The youth leader responded by saying that they were frustrated that they 
had no opportunity to play sport, in particular football, because of lack of space due to 
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land disputes.  This discussion thus presented the chiefs with the solution of resolving 
the land dispute and making a football field.  Thus, involving as many female and 
youth community leaders as possible in the design and implementation of projects, as 
well as encouraging them to attend as participants, helps to ensure different 
viewpoints are articulated and creative conversations can be had.  The use of local 
facilitators is also an important way to mediate conflicts in a culturally sensitive 
manner.  This follows Braithwaite’s (2010) suggestion to train local trainers to have a 
‘double consciousness’ of indigenous ways of thinking about justice and of the global 
movement for restorative justice. 
 
(c) Local level initiatives by chiefs 
 
A number of individual chiefs as well as chiefly councils have made moves to amend 
their local kastom system by incorporating certain features of the state system.  The 
most widespread example of this is the writing down of their kastom laws as so-called 
‘by-laws’ (White and Lindstrom 1994: 229). Such by-laws typically set out the 
various offences that contravene kastom laws and provide a penalty in terms of 
livestock or foodstuffs or woven mats. These by-laws are recorded for a variety of 
reasons, including that if the laws are written down the people cannot question the 
chiefs’ authority – i.e. it is written “in black and white”  - and that if a chief goes to 
court then he has to be able to justify his decision (Forsyth 2009: 106).  There are 
many other examples of deliberate borrowing from the state system, including: the 
keeping minutes of kastom meetings; the creation of village police; and the 
introduction of the concept of payment of fees to get chiefs to hear cases.
 
 In at least 
one village there are village police who wear a special uniform and work on behalf of 
the chief to provide security and to take statements from people making complaints.   
They say they wear the uniform in order to “mekem spirit blong wok blong mifala 
strong, igat pawa” (make our work spirit strong and give power).  These borrowings 
are symptomatic of the widespread open-mindedness and willingness to embrace new 
ideas that exists among chiefs.  This attitude is illustrated by one of the by-laws from 
a ward council in Penama Province which, roughly translated, states: 
 
The Council does not agree that women should wear shorts but we understand 
that they have the right to so she can wear shorts so long as they come down to 
her knees and she does not wear them in front of her brother or some other 
relatives or else she will be fined.  
 
These borrowings are also likely to be in response to a desire to co-opt state power 
and to enforce chiefly authority. Chiefs often state that they want training and 
assistance to enable them to leftemap (lift-up) their system. This positive attitude 
towards change  could be capitalised on by international donors in developing a 
project that seeks to support chiefs in learning about, and adapting and adopting 
beneficial features of the state justice system in order to enhance the quality of kastom 
conflict management.  As I have argued elsewhere (Forsyth 2009: 225) such 
adaptations, which will ideally be mutual, will enhance the ability of different actors 






An important issue in terms of the legitimacy of the state courts is the extent to which 
kastom payments are taken into account in sentencing for criminal offences.  If the 
courts do not take the kastom penalty into account, the defendants are left with a sense 
of grievance at having been subjected to two punishments, and the chiefs feel that 
their work has been overlooked or, worse, undermined.  On the other hand, there can 
be concerns that people merely make kastom payments as a way of ‘buying their way 
out of trouble.’ 
 
In 2006 the Penal Code (Amendment) Act was passed. It requires that state courts 
must take into account any compensation made or due by the offender under kastom 
as a mitigating factor in sentencing.  This changed the previous position, which 
allowed courts to take kastom into account but did not require them to do so.  There 
are, however, still problems with the way courts take kastom payments into account.
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First, the court is not permitted to halt or terminate the proceedings because the 
kastom system has already dealt with the matter.  Second, there is very little inquiry 
into whether the parties are satisfied with the settlement, or whether or not the 
payment was appropriate according to the kastom of the relevant area.  Further, the 
courts have hitherto been inconsistent in their approach to determining the extent to 
which a customary payment can mitigate a criminal sentence.  In discussing these 
inadequacies and highlighting others, Paterson and Jowitt (2008: 47) make the 
following suggestions for reforming the way courts take kastom into account in 
sentencing: 
 
First, the judges could, at their annual conference, discuss these issues and 
resolve that judicial practice will change. Alternatively, a conference or 
workshop could be convened to discuss these issues and pass resolutions 
which could be regarded by the courts as expressions of community attitudes. 
Third, legislation could be enacted to provide guidance for the courts.  
 
This initiative demonstrates that when making linkages between the two systems it 
can be insufficient to simply outline broad principles and leave it to the stakeholders, 
who in this case were the judges and lawyers, to implement them on a case-by-case 
basis.  This may lead to disparity and unfairness. Instead what is required is an 
opportunity for all who will be involved in implementing the new or reformed link to 
participate in developing a uniform policy, identifying in as detailed a way as possible 
how it should work. In addition, there must be a built-in evaluation process to follow 
up on the results of the reform after a certain number of years have passed, so as to 
determine if it has helped or hindered the particular objective(s) of the initiative. 
 
Donor and other outsider-generated links 
 
(a) Community Justice Supervisors  
 
In 2005 the New Zealand Aid Program  (NZAID) began a major Correctional 
Services Project in Vanuatu. The Project devised a number of reform proposals that 
“create opportunities for linkages between Kastomary processes and the Courts (NZ 
AID 2005, [34].”
8
  It established a taskforce of senior ni-Vanuatu employed in the 
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state justice system and the Malvatumauri and held “extensive consultations . . . with 
a number of stakeholders and interest groups in five or the six provinces” (NZ AID 
2005, [34]). A central proposal was the establishment of a Community Probation 
Service which adopts a “Community Justice Process”.  This process is said to build on 
and strengthen the Vanuatu tradition of community participation in the justice process 
and to preserve and enhance the existing practice of chiefs resolving disputes in what 
the Project refers to as a traditional context. The process is based on the idea that at a 
number of points there are opportunities for matters to be referred back to community 
leaders, principally chiefs and pastors, for resolution and reconciliation. The most 
visible aspect of this to date is the establishment of the position of Community Justice 
Supervisors (CJS) in the Correctional Services Act of 2006.  The supervisors are 
generally chiefs or pastors and they voluntarily supervise community work sentences 
handed down by the Court. They are also often involved in the 'pastoral' care of 
offenders and checking that their relations with the community are harmonious. In 
many cases they have already been involved with the offender in a kastom process.  
According to an overseas advisor to the project,
9
a recent workshop demonstrated that 
there is “obviously strong support for the model” and his perception was that chiefs 
feel there is a good fit between the two models (of state justice and kastom conflict 
management).  
 
This project is an important one given the limited detention facilities in Vanuatu, that 
are currently overcrowded and have been criticised for human rights abuses (Forsyth 
2009: 157-159).  In 2010 there were 125 detainees and 260 offenders were being 
managed in the community by 60 CJSs (Whibley-Smith 2010).  Involving the chiefs 
in probation thus: frees up valuable prison space; reflects the importance of kastom 
practices in Vanuatu; acknowledges the value, status and knowledge of respected 
community members; makes the offender accountable to their own community and; 
contributes to the rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders.  CJSs are also 
functioning as important linkage points between the community and the state justice 
system (Whibley-Smith 2010).  Although there has not to date been detailed research 
into the efficacy of the program, preliminary research indicates some problems over 
boundary issues; past issues impacting on CJS/Offender relationship and the other 
responsibilities of CJSs impeding their work (Whibley-Smith 2010).   
 
 (b) Vanuatu Judiciary Conference 
 
At my suggestion, and facilitated by funding from NZAID, in 2006 the Vanuatu 
Judiciary held their annual conference on the topic of the relationship between the 
state justice system and the kastom system at the University of the South Pacific.  This 
was the first time that the judiciary, chiefs, police lawyers and academics had come 
together to discuss the issues relating to the existence of the two systems of dispute 
resolution in Vanuatu.  As such, it was very much an exploration of the issues 
involved, a discussion of the possible tensions, and a sharing of ideas about future 
directions that could be explored.  The first part involved a description of the current 
relationship between the two systems, and was facilitated by a series of papers 
presented by members of the judiciary, police and the chiefs as well as through group 
discussion. The point that was emphasized by the Secretary of the NCC and other 
speakers was that the resources spent on the provision of justice all go to the formal 
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system and none to the kastom system, and yet the majority of the population have 
their disputes resolved by the latter.  The second part was devoted to a discussion of 
the current problems with the relationship, which was managed through a series of 
papers and then by group discussion in small groups.  There was a great deal of 
agreement amongst the participants in relation to what the problems are, some of the 
most significant being: lack of communication between the two systems; lack of clear 
pathways between the two systems; lack of clear guidelines about which system 
should deal with which cases; the fact that the two systems undermine each other in a 
variety of ways; and also the problem of people being punished twice for the same 
offence, once by the state system and once by the kastom system (see Forsyth 2006).  
The final part of the conference was concerned with a consideration of what steps 
could be taken to improve the relationship between the two systems and involved 
small groups considering a series of questions designed to provoke and focus 
discussion, as well as plenary discussion of the findings of each group.  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the participants were far more divided in their views about the 
possible solutions (Forsyth 2006).  For example, when considering the question of 
sharing of jurisdiction, some groups proposed that the decision of which system 
should deal with a particular case should rest with the chief. Another group suggested 
that in urban areas, state law should apply whereas in rural areas, kastom law should 
apply unless there is no kastom law which covers the situation. Other groups proposed 
that chiefs should deal with minor matters and the state with serious matters. Some 
groups felt that kastom should always be used to deal with matters relating to natural 
resources, even in urban areas.  There was also disagreement about whether 
individuals should have the right to opt-out of being dealt with by the kastom system, 
with some feeling there should be no opt-out as this undermines the chiefs’ authority, 
while others stated that there should be freedom of choice. Others said that a person 
should always be able to go to the state system afterwards. Although undertakings 
were made by chiefs, the police and the judiciary about moving forward with issues 
identified during the conference (see Forsyth 2006), little headway has in fact been 
made.  Like the action plans in the Kastom Governance project, this demonstrates the 
important role academics can play in facilitating discussions between different actors 
involved in conflict management, by creating the space and the conditions for such 
dialogue to occur.  However, it also shows the necessity to have follow up support to 
assist participants in actioning undertakings made. 
 
The next section proposes a theoretical framework that centres on the creation of 
linkages in reform and development programming. 
 
 
A Conflict Management Web Framework 
 
This section responds to observations such as Baker’s (2010: 601) that worldwide 
there has been “scant understanding of links by the development community and in 
particular by those engaged in police and justice reform programmes.”  It proposes a 
new conceptual framework, the ‘conflict management web’, to assist international 
donors and others to understand and work with links in reform in this field.  This 
framework is based upon a number of key insights from network theory (Wellman 
1983), nodal governance (Shearing and Wood 2003) and regulatory space metaphors 
(Scott 2001).  It recognises that there are multiple state, non-state as well as hybrid 
actors (meaning neither fully state, nor non-state) and institutions, which possess a 
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range of relevant resources that are currently acting in the conflict management arena, 
and that there are formal (mandated by state law) and informal relationships or ties 
between them.  It also recognises that these relationships are “complex, dynamic and 
horizontal” (Scott 2001: 330), and cause the various actors and institutions involved 
to undergo “processes of assimilation, transformation and adoption” (Baker 2010: 
613).  Moreover, the relational ties within a network are crucial to determining the 
“strength, cohesion, collaborative intensity and sustainability” (ibid.: 600) of the 
network as a whole. 
 
However, the web approach presented here also differs in some respect from these 
theories.  It has an explicitly normative as well as an empirical focus (cf Wellman 
1983: 162), as it is geared towards achieving cohesion of the overall structure, not 
merely to understand the various linkages that exist.  Also, unlike classic social 
network theory, it does not view the attributes of individuals as being less important 
than their relationships and ties with other actors within the network.  Indeed, 
evidence from fieldwork in Vanuatu suggests that personal characteristics of key 
individuals are often essential in any development initiative, and are often inextricably 
linked with their ability to create and maintain relational ties.   
 
The key features of the conflict management web framework are as follows.  First, it 
focuses on identifying, strengthening and, where necessary, building, mutually 
supporting linkages between different actors and institutions actively involved in 
conflict management (or indeed any other field).  This avoids the adoption of a 
hierarchical, state-centralist approach to reform and frees up reform initiatives to 
consider how, for example, state institutions can be positively influenced by and kept 
in check by non-state actors and institutions (see Scott 2001: 337).  It also helps to 
ensure that agents of reform (be they state governments or international donors) are 
not duplicating the efforts (or worse, inadvertently undermining the efforts) of another 
reform project.  Second, this framework emphasises the sharing of information about 
what reform initiatives work and why between various state and non-state actors in 
the field and also donors, NGOs and academics.  This will foster home grown 
adaptation and innovation to replace the current tendency to look immediately outside 
for ideas and models.  In turn, this is likely to increase the legitimacy of conflict 
management institutions and actors, which has been identified as an important issue in 
state-building and reducing conflict and violence (World Development Bank 2011: 
84).  Action learning and reflection are thus central to the framework, and involve 
those involved in reform regularly assessing the benefits of their projects to better 
inform themselves and others in the web about how to implement reforms better.
10
   
 
Third, this framework promotes multiple, small-scale, locally based reform projects, 
thus taking the focus away from centralised institution-building projects.  Ideally, 
such projects can be on a longer time-scale than would be possible if national 
coverage were attempted as there will not be as much pressure for short term results 
as not so much will be riding on the outcome.  Small-scale projects can also be 
intensely local and collaborative and give as much agency as possible to the 
participants involved to determine the types of reforms to discuss and to implement.  
An approach that favours multiple projects recognises that many reform initiatives 
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will fail, and also promotes creative (risky) reform initiatives by not having all of the 
reforming agency’s eggs in the one basket.  The World Development Report (World 
Bank 2011: 32) similarly suggests “pilot many different types of approaches to see 
which work best; accept a higher failure rate; evaluate rigorously and adapt quickly; 
and scale up approaches that are working.” If many different approaches are tried, the 
failures of some will be counter-balanced by the successes of others.   
 
Finally, the conflict management web framework promotes a decentralised approach 
to conflict management, which can be of great use where the state alone does not have 
the ability (or the will) to meet the conflict management needs of citizens.  This works 
in four ways: it provides alternative paths to conflict management where state courts 
are over-burdened or non-functional; competition provides incentives to state justice 
institutions to improve their performance; it can help to avoid the problem of 
“capture” of donor-funded judicial reform efforts by elites (White 2009); and it can 
act as a check on power in the hands of a single justice institution where that 
institution is abusing its power (Braithwaite 1997).   
 
So, what are the actual implications of this for states, international donors and others 
wishing to undertake justice reform projects?  First, it means approaching conflict 
management reform in a holistic way, taking account of all the actors and institutions 
involved in the field in a given jurisdiction, including international donors, academics 
and NGOs.  This is an explicit recognition of the political nature of, and role played 
by, donors in a locally dynamic system.  Developing links may be difficult where 
there are competing agendas at play, or competition for scarce resources (financial or 
social capital for example), but developing even weak links between competing actors 
and institutions may foster dialogue that will in the long term produce a more positive 
relationship between them.  Granovetter (2005: 34) argues that greater density of links 
between nodes “makes ideas about proper behaviour more likely to encountered 
repeatedly, discussed and fixed.”  It may also be difficult in countries where 
customary or religious systems have broken down or are discredited, although there 
may be other new grass-roots initiatives that have sprung up to replace them.  Of 
course, in situations where there are no viable non-state actors or institutions to work 
with, the conflict management web framework  may not work and it may be necessary 
to consider a different framework, such as creating a new hybrid structure from 
scratch. 
 
Second, it means that all projects will need to start with a network analysis of the 
different institutions and actors involved in conflict management and the links 
between them.  This is more than a standard stocktake of visible actors and formal 
counterparts, and will inevitably require in-country fieldwork rather than a desk based 
literature review.  As demonstrated above, much of what actually happens in practice 
in conflict management in developing countries cannot be understood from the 
literature alone.  Relying solely on written materials will prioritise state agencies and 
may result in overlooking important grass-roots initiatives that could be built upon.  
This analysis will involve investigating whether any existing institutions or actors 
have agendas that the particular reform project can strategically align with, before 
starting to create a new reform project from scratch.  It will also mean creating 
opportunities for dialogues to occur between donors, academics and those involved in 
conflict management about what initiatives are currently underway and need support, 
such as the conversation that started the Kastom Governance project.  It is also a 
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project that requires an anthropological type approach i.e. an understanding of the 
local political economy and how things actually work in practice in-country, rather 
than just technical legal skills. 
 
Of course this is likely to be an expensive and time-consuming process and does not 
easily fit into the current incentive structure for donors (Gibson et al. 2005; World 
Bank 2011: 26).  However, a potential aid may be the tools developed in an IT context 
to deal with decentralised sources of information, such as a wiki, an interactive 
website that facilitates the sharing of information by many people.  If each country 
developed a conflict management web wiki that could be used to share information 
about what projects were happening and reviews of them and associated resources, 
this would go a long way to reinforcing many existing links between actors and 
institutions involved in conflict management.  It may be that a state government could 
seek donor funding for establishing and maintaining the wiki, and require everyone 
involved in the justice sector to keep the site updated as a condition of project 
approval.  Although many rural communities do not have access to the internet, this is 
changing fast with the huge global expansion of mobile and broadband networks.  In 
Vanuatu, community leaders in even remote areas often have links with people who 
do have access, and so reliance on a web-based tool will not necessarily exclude more 
remote actors from the conversation. 
 
One of the major challenges that the conflict management web framework raises is 
determining what degree of co-ordination and strategic alignment is desirable and 
practically attainable.  The provision of conflict management services often involves 
local and national political issues, competing agendas, and as demonstrated in section 
one, different views of what the aims of conflict management should be.  Further, 
having different justice providers can lead to problems associated with forum 
shopping as discussed above.  The question of the governance of networks is a large 
one and beyond the scope of this article.  It seems highly unlikely that any 
organisation or institution would be willing or able to take on such a role, especially 
in countries where the state is weak.  A single source of oversight may also cut across 
many of the benefits of the decentralised approach.  A better solution in the 
comparatively simple context of a single nation state is to adopt a self-steering 
approach (Schout and Jordan 2005) that focuses on developing and strengthening the 
links between the different actors and institutions involved, both in terms of 
substantive issues of conflict management and reform project co-ordination.  
Dialogue about potentially competing reform agendas will promote an articulation of 
the different agendas at stake, which in turn may assist in finding some middle 
ground, when all sides see what resources can be fruitfully shared (for example the 
Kastom Governance project includes gender as an issue that is discussed in the 
workshops), although this may need time (for example the relative failure of the 
Chiefs Bill).  The more networking and communication that occurs between the actors 
that engage in spinning different strands of the justice web, the greater is the chance 
that the web as a whole will have coherence.  Braithwaite and Drahos argue (2000: 
32) that webs of dialogue are effective for both weak and strong actors and can result 
in defining a problem, agreeing on principles and rules to solve it, and enforcing those 





This article has argued that two different types of linkages need to be made to 
improve the quality of conflict management in a country such as Vanuatu, where 
crucial resources (financial, human, organisational etc) and legitimacy are dispersed 
between state and non-state institutions. The first type is between those involved in 
conflict management at both state and non-state levels.  Such linkages will facilitate a 
more effective sharing of resources, as trust and understanding builds between the key 
actors involved in the administration of each system (Granovetter 2005: 34).  The aim 
is to develop what de Sousa Santos (1987: 298) calls interlegality, where there is 
“continuous interaction in the main between different legal perceptions, thereby 
influencing and shaping new normative orders adapted to considering cultural 
diversity” (Svesson 2005: 51-52). International donors have an important role to play 
in facilitating these linkages by creating opportunities for dialogue to promote 
knowledge exchange between key actors, such as the Kastom Governance project and 
the Judiciary conference.   
 
The second type of linkage that needs to be improved is that between donors, NGOs, 
state governments and non-state actors and institutions about the different justice 
reform initiatives that are taking place in a country.  This could foster a greater 
harmonisation of agendas, lessen the risk of one initiative undermining another, allow 
resources to be used more efficiently, promote discussion about different visions for 
reform, and help to identify existing initiatives by non-state actors that would benefit 
from better resourcing. 
 
This article proposes that a conflict management web framework may be adopted as a 
conceptual and practical tool to assist in developing both types of linkages.  This 
approach is based on analysing the nature and extent of the ties currently linking all 
actors and institutions involved in conflict management in a particular country, 
including those who provide material and organisational resources, such as 
international donors.  The understandings gained from such an analysis can then be 
used to program reform initiatives that can be strategically aligned with 
autochthonous initiatives currently underway, or which create new linkages that 
promote a more efficient sharing of the existing resources and social capital.  This 
will increase the chances of any reform fully capitalising on existing resources, being 
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